On Tuesday, September 24, 2013, Rethink Institute hosted a 2-part panel discussion at its office headquarters with Turkic American Alliance. The conferences examined Turkey’s foreign policy challenges against the backdrop of the current developments in the Middle East while addressing the following questions:
- How will Turkish foreign policy play out in the near future?
- What are Turkey’s options in the Middle East?
- What should be the nature of the model partnership between Turkey and in the United States?
- How about Turkey’s other significant interests in the European Union, the Caucasus and Central Asia?
Session I took place from 2:00pm to 3:15pm and debated the Parameters, Priorities and Prospects of Turkish Foreign Policy. Panelists included Dr. İhsan Dağı, Professor in the Department of International Relations of Middle East Technical University; Dr. Michael Werz, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress; and Dr. Fevzi Bilgin, the Executive Director at Rethink Institute.
Dr. Werz opened the conference with his presentation on various issues such as Turkey’s diminishing foreign policy leverage; Turkey’s cultural worldview undermining its standing in the world; the parallel between the Gezi Park protests and Turkey’s external affairs vis-à-vis divisive rhetoric by Prime Minister Erdoğan; and the need for greater respect for diversity and pluralism in domestic affairs.
Dr. Bilgin, who also moderated Session I, presented his thoughts next, oriented largely according to the important work of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Strategic Depth (2001). Within this framework, Dr. Bilgin discussed the darkest times of Turkish history during 1990-2001 as the precursor to the paradigmatic shift encapsulated by the AK Party. Under the governance of AKP, Turkey became an “idea,” a “vision,” a powerful yet peaceful and cooperative country engaged in proactive policy shifts, though not without concerns of neo-Ottoman and Islamist tendencies. Nonetheless, this paradigmatic shift in Turkish foreign policy was a marked move beyond the passive, parochial, and politically lacking will of previous foreign policies in Turkey. But despite these important and “noble” goals and initiatives, according to Dr. Bilgin foreign policy under AKP has ultimately failed. Dr. Bilgin recommended that for future foreign policy success, Turkey must invest in the ‘human factor’ of Turkish external affairs through, perhaps most significantly, a dramatic overhaul of Turkey’s language learning priorities towards the languages of its neighbors—Russia, Iran, and the Middle East—in order to realize its foreign policy visions.
Finally, Dr. Dağı addressed the conference. Dr. Dağı discussed the differences in foreign policy as under traditional Turkish governance and as under AKP governance. Regarding the latter, Dr. Dağı recalled that Prime Minister Erdoğan’s first state visit was to Iran, followed by Libya. This sparked a huge debate in Turkey as it defied traditional foreign policy expectations. Furthermore, AKP foreign policy initiatives were driven by its membership to NATO, as well as its aspirations for membership into the European Union. Dr. Dağı called such breaks in traditional foreign policy by AKP as an “anomaly” unrepresentative of “genuine” Turkish policy. But for such anomalous policies to succeed, Turkey had to perform very well in implementing policies of economic development and democratization in order to sustain political support. These goals would prove particularly difficult to obtain due to Turkey’s traditional state-entrenched institutions of the military, judiciary and bureaucracy and, to a lesser extent, civil society and the media. Turkey has also moved towards policies of cooperation and alliances, and engagement and mediation over conflict and adversarial and relationships. Indeed, foreign policy has become the instrument wielded by AKP to empower itself vis-à-vis the old institutions in Turkey.
So concluded Session I. During a brief 15-minute break, conversations ensued over coffee and tea.
Session II took place from 3:30pm to 4:45pm and discussed Turkey’s Middle East Conundrum. Panelists included Dr. Çağrı Erhan, Professor in the Department of International Relations at Ankara University; Dr. Savaş Genç, Professor in the Department of International Relations at Fatih University; and Alan Makovsky, Senior Professional Staff Members at the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Dr. Erhan opened Session II with a PowerPoint presentation. According to Dr. Erhan, the Arab Spring was not the main cause of Turkish foreign policy failure. The problem lies instead with fundamentally flawed foreign policy structure on the part of the ruling party. For instance, how could Turkey pursue a Zero Problems Policy with its neighbors when some of its neighbors or allies are in conflict (i.e. Azerbaijan and Armenia, the United Sates and Iran)? Dr. Erhan referred to this as a miscalculation of Turkish capacities. Dr. Erhan also discussed the growing trend in Turkish foreign policy of an “internalization of Middle Eastern development” in Turkey. For instance, despite Turkey’s very vocal and public condemnation of the coup in Egypt that ousted democratically elected President Mohammed Morsi, Turkey rather inconveniently also requires investment money from the Gulf monarch states. As a result, there has been no official critique of the Saudis for supporting General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in his removal of President Morsi. Finally, the main motive for democratic reforms in Turkey under the ruling party was EU membership; without such an anchor with which to tether its policies, Dr. Erhan believes it will not be possible to move forward with the reforms.
Mr. Makovsky took the floor next. According to Mr. Makovsky, Turkish foreign policies have exacerbated problems in the MENA region. In Syria, for instance, the U.S. was not pleased that Turkey was supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood of Syria when the Syrian Opposition Council convened and moved to dilute its strength. Tension also stems from the fact that Al-Nusra Front and other radical Islamic groups are able to traverse Turkish territory and cross into Syria. This is especially troubling considering that, in the wake of the Ergenekon trial and the arrest of nearly one dozen top military generals, the Turkish military is not exactly at its peak strength. In concluding, Mr. Makovsky wondered whether or not Turkey is willing to put its money where its mouth is.
Lastly, Dr. Genç, who also served as moderator for Session II, presented a very interesting survey he had conducted in the Middle East regarding the ways in which Middle Eastern elites perceive Turkish foreign policy. The data was very telling. For instance, more than 50% of Arab elites believe that Turkey views itself as a guardian of ex-Ottoman geography. The study, which measured elitism in terms of ethnicity/religion and political views, was further broken down according to nation states. In Iraq, for example, an overwhelming majority of Sunni elites perceives Turkey as the regional Middle Eastern power, while Shi’ite Iraqis Iran. To conclude, Dr. Genç maintained that Turkish foreign policy has exceeded its policy goals beyond its economic and military capability in the region.
Following Session II, baklava, börek and refreshments were served as guests mingled among themselves. This culminated Rethink’s conference on Turkish Foreign Policy Challenges. The conference had a great turnout with well over 50 attendees, representing a diverse range of organizations and institutions.
Be sure to check out the Twitter conversation at #RethinkTurkishFP.
